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A lthough frequently viewed as losers of European integrat ion,  nat iona l parliaments have reacted 
promptly and gained as much from the 
crisis as they have lost. Not only have they 
compensated for the constraints suffered 
due to greater fiscal integration, they have 
acquired new prerogatives in EU affairs, 
created new avenues for the political 
contestation of EU policies, and brought 
the EU closer to the European citizens. 
National parliaments have become more 
Europeanised. They are effectively the 
beneficiaries of the euro crisis and there 
very good reasons for this.
The economic component of the 
Economic and Monetary Union is 
premised on the EU’s close coordination 
of domestic economic policies in order 
to ensure price stability, sound public 
finances and a sustainable balance of 
payments in the Member States. These 
principles are upheld through broad 
economic policy guidelines (BEPGs), which 
are set out by the Council of Ministers on 
a recommendation of the Commission 
and after receiving conclusions of the 
European Council, while the European 
Parliament is merely informed of the 
outcome. Based on Commission reports, 
the Council monitors the Member States’ 
adherence to these guidelines and checks 
whether they respect the fiscal limits of 
3% of GDP for the annual budget deficit 
and 60% of GDP for public debt. The 
so-called excessive deficit procedure is 
envisaged in order to sanction deviations 
from these targets, which can result in 
the imposition of fines or non-interest-
bearing deposits. These are the key 
aspects of what is known as the EU’s 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), whose 
legal basis is laid down in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union 
and the relevant Protocol annexed 
thereto. While the SGP was honed by 
means of secondary EU legislation in 
1997 and 2005, in response to the debt 
crisis the EU adopted a further set of 
measures to reform the governance of 
economic and financial affairs.
In November 2011, the so-called ‘Six 
Pack’ (five regulations and a directive) 
established a new form of economic 
policy coordination called the European 
Semester, which is a six-month period 
lasting from January to June each year, 
during which BEPGs are adopted and 
implemented. The European Council 
defines economic priorities and gives 
general policy orientations to the 
Member States on the basis of the 
Commission’s Annual Growth Survey. 
Taking these into account, the euro 
area Member States submit their fiscal 
plans to the Commission in the form of 
stability programmes, whereas non-euro 
area Member States submit convergence 
programmes. All Member States are 
also required to submit national reform 
programmes on the intended structural 
reforms aimed at boosting growth 
and jobs. The Commission then drafts 
country-specif ic recommendations 
(CSRs), which are endorsed by the 
European Council and adopted by the 
Council. The second half of the year 
is called the National Semester and it 
culminates with the national parliaments’ 
adoption of annual budgets on the basis 
of the CSRs and within a very short 
timeframe.
In March 2012, all Member States except 
the UK and the Czech Republic acted 
outside the EU framework to conclude 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union, known as the Fiscal 
Compact. This Treaty mandates the 
domestic enactment of the balanced 
budget rule in the form of binding and 
permanent provisions, preferably of a 
constitutional nature. This rule requires 
that the annual budget deficit be at its 
country-specific medium-term objective 
but no more than 0.5% of GDP or 1% of 
GDP where the public debt is significantly 
below 60% of GDP.
All of this was complemented in May 
2013 by the ‘Two Pack’ of regulations, 
which further improved EU policing of 
the economic and budgetary planning 
in the euro area. It does so by enacting 
a comprehensive regime for the 
surveillance of euro area Member States 
experiencing or threatened with serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability as well as by streamlining the 
correction of excessive deficits.
The role of parliaments under the 
provisions of these legal instruments is 
minor. Apart from declarations of respect 
for parliamentary competences and 
certain rights to receive and exchange 
information, notably in the form of an 
‘economic dialogue’, both the European 
Parliament and national parliaments 
are de jure sidelined in EU economic 
coordination processes. The underlying 
assumption that the national budget will 
be decided between the government and 
the European Commission in isolation 
from parliamentary influence is palpable. 
Centre stage is instead occupied by the 
EU executive actors, spearheaded by 
the European Council, the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission. This raises 
questions of accountability for decisions 
that cut deeply into public money 
expenditure and thus into citizen welfare. 
Mechanisms for holding members of 
these EU institutions to account are 
either non-existent or ill-suited given the 
confidential, intransparent and speedy 
nature of decision making, which was 
further aggravated by the crisis. Especially 
the Prime Ministers and ministers, who sit 
on the European Council and the Council 
respectively, are bound to render account 
domestically to national parliaments. EU 
law explicitly requires this, too.
As the EU made inroads into the 
‘most sacred’ of their constitutional 
prerogatives – the budgetary sovereignty 
– national parliaments felt the threat of 
their power of the purse being invaded. 
Yet they did not sit idly by. Whether in 
the Eurozone or not, they have swiftly 
adapted their scrutiny to the new EU 
economic governance scheme. The 
examples of Portugal, France and the 
UK furnish a powerful illustration thereof.
As a bailout state that has undergone 
severe austerit y and experienced 
significant external influence on its 
social policies, Portugal has completely 
overhauled its parliamentary scrutiny 
of EU affairs. The 2012 amendment of 
the European Scrutiny Act and several 
informal reforms have resulted in 
MPs henceforth concentrating on the 
scrutiny of strategic European Council 
matters rather than on the nitty-gritty 
technical matters of EU legislation. 
There has been a shift from ex post to 
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ex ante policing of European Council 
activities, insofar as a plenary debate is 
now mandatory before each European 
Council meeting rather than after the last 
European Council meeting of each EU 
Presidency. The organisation of plenary 
debates on the European Semester, EU 
economic governance instruments and 
the Portuguese stability programme, 
called the Fiscal Strategy Document, 
have become a statutory obligation. 
Additionally, the Commission’s Annual 
Growth Survey topped the list of the 
Assembly’s scrutiny priorities in the past 
several years. Governmental ouster, 
the ‘nuclear weapon’ in the arsenal of 
parliamentary powers, which is widely 
considered too radical to resort to in 
EU affairs, was employed in Portugal 
in March 2011, when the refusal of 
the Socrates Government’s stability 
programme led to its resignation.
France, a country with a constitutional 
tradition of constrained parliament 
with a system where the budgetary 
process is under the tight grip of the 
government and with few possibilities 
for parliamentary intervention, has 
passed legislation to provide for 
obligatory plenary debates on the 
stability programme which end with a 
vote. This is a significant parliamentary 
empowerment as it allows MPs and 
senators to reject the government’s 
plans. In legal terms, this counterbalances 
the government’s constitutional right 
to make the adoption of the budget a 
matter of confidence and thus have it 
approved without the parliament’s vote. 
In political practice, however, the holding 
of a vote on the stability programme is 
not a watertight guarantee because 
this statutory provision, despite a clear 
instruction to this effect, is implemented 
in accordance with a constitutional 
provision that enables the government 
to decide whether there will be a vote 
on declarations it makes in Parliament. 
This is a suboptimal solution and, since 
there is no compelling reason why 
the government should be allowed to 
monopolize the debate, parliamentarians 
should stand up for their right to pass a 
vote on each stability programme. The 
statute on the programming of public 
finances for 2011-2014 entitles them to 
it. Yet when the vote is indeed held and 
the programme rejected, the government 
is precluded from submitting it to the 
Commission. In any event, there are 
important deliberative benefits to holding 
debates, which are to politicize the public 
sphere and enable the citizens to reach 
an informed decision on the policies and 
behaviour of the executive. Furthermore, 
thanks to the initiative of several 
committee chairmen, it has become 
customary practice in the Lower House of 
Parliament, the Assemblée nationale, to 
adopt a resolution on the Commission’s 
observations on France’s stability and 
national reform programmes.
In the United Kingdom, every step towards 
greater EU integration poses a particular 
concern due to the legislative supremacy 
of the Westminster Parliament. Despite 
Britain’s permanent EMU derogation, 
the European Semester does apply to 
the UK. Both the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords have not only 
thoroughly scrutinised the EU economic 
governance reform but often commented 
on matters that do not apply to the UK, 
which speaks of their wish to contribute 
to the wider EU policy-making debate. 
Their Lordships were particularly vocal 
in arguing that the European Semester 
is highly beneficial for the Member 
States and that it strengthens rather 
than downgrades the role of national 
parliaments. Furthermore, the 1993 
European Communities (Amendment) 
Act is used as a legal basis to hold 
plenary debates on the UK convergence 
programmes. The House of Lords also 
holds six-monthly series of evidence 
sessions on the euro crisis to keep abreast 
of the fast-moving developments.
In all the three Member States, the 
actual parliamentary scrutiny of the 
annual growth surveys, stability or 
convergence programmes, national 
reform programmes and country-specific 
recommendations exhibits the trend of 
increased parliamentary activity both in 
the plenary and in committee, especially 
in the European affairs and finance 
committees.
To further bolster their input in EU 
decision making, national parliaments 
and the European Parliament established 
in April 2013 an Interparliamentary 
Conference on Economic and Financial 
Governance of the EU. Its aim is to 
exchange information and best practice 
with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of 
EU decisions in the fiscal area. This is the 
third interparliamentary conference in the 
EU, besides COSAC and the one for CFSP/
CSDP. Its political significance lies not in 
enforcing the political responsibility for EU 
economic coordination but in facilitating 
interparliamentary deliberation so as to 
discuss discrepancies, increase mutual 
understanding of the respective fiscal 
plans and thus upgrade the overall 
coherence between the nat ional 
budgetary processes.
Furthermore, under the collective 
pressure of national parliaments, the 
Commission agreed to incorporate the 
European Semester into the political 
dialogue that it has conducted with 
national parliaments since 2006 in the 
form of the so-called ‘Barroso Initiative’. 
This dialogue enables parliaments to 
express their opinions on any aspect 
of EU initiatives, including not only 
their subsidiarity and proportionality 
compliance, but also their legal basis, 
pol i t ical  oppor tuneness and the 
implications they may have for the 
domestic legal system. The Commission 
will therefore engage in an ‘intensified 
dialogue’ after it publishes the Annual 
Growth Survey and after the European 
Council endorses the Council’s country-
specific recommendations. Moreover, 
upon request by a national parliament, 
the Commission undertook to organise 
meetings either personally with its Vice-
President for Economic and Monetary 
Affairs or another senior official or by 
videoconference.
The diverse and multilevel parliamentary 
reaction to the euro crisis and the 
reformed EU economic governance 
apparatus mitigates the forecasts of 
parliamentary erosion. To the contrary, 
national parliaments have seized the 
opportunity presented by the euro 
crisis, gained important juridico-political 
means of pronouncement and debate 
in EU affairs, and created new avenues 
of participation and cooperation in EU 
policy making. To conclude, the euro 
crisis certainly brought Brussels closer 
to the national purse, but domestic law 
and politics have proved resilient enough 
to counteract the deepening of the 
notorious democratic deficit, which has 
stymied the European integration process 
virtually since its inception. National 
parliaments have successfully weathered 
the storm, but in order to make full use of 
their scrutiny rights, they must continue 
to put pressure on the government and 
EU institutions to overcome the obstacles 
they encounter in this regard in the 
everyday political process.
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